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Price Behavior in Corn Market with Identity Preserved Types
Introduction
Corn is the number one crop in the U.S. in terms of acreage and overall value (USDA).
Given the wide range of possible uses for corn products and because of tremendous
technological advances, corn is at the heart of the increasing industrialization of the U.S.
grain system. US corn growers are faced with an increasingly differentiated market where
identity preserved (IP) and segregated corn types (henceforth “specialty”) coexist with
the generic standard commodity (henceforth “generic”) corn. The specialty corn market
increased from 3.3% of total US corn in 1996 to 10.9% in 2000 (US Grains Council) and
these trends are expected to continue, driven by several forces including biotechnology,
technological innovations in processing and more differentiated consumer demand.
The economic implications for corn growers and processors are expected to be
considerably different under a differentiated corn market compared to the homogenous
corn system. IP production focuses on providing the customer with a higher valued
product that commands premiums. Identity preservation involves additional costs, as IP
crops require segregated marketing channels and additional transaction costs in the form
of testing, monitoring and product certification (Bullock, Desquilbet and Nitsi, 2001;
Maltsbarger and Kalaitzandonakes, 2001; Lin, Chambers and Harwood, 2000).
However, the development of these specialty crops depends on the extent to which a
price premium relative to generic corn is above IP costs.
Several economic factors influence the dynamics of price premium formation and
variability.  Under conditions of excess supply, price premia may be eroded substantially2
from one year to another. This is the case of non-GM corn, which experienced a sharp
decline in the price premium from 2000 to 2001 due to excess supply of non-GM corn
and ease of testing for GM presence (Moss et al., 2002).
Price premia of specialty corn types relative to generic corn also vary from year to
year depending on factors such as crop quality, and the presence and type of production
contracts.  The quality of the corn crop has a significant impact on price premia,
particularly if specialty corn types are produced without contracts. Under production
contracts, price premia depend on the contract type. The most common contract type is
“market price plus a premium”, which leaves the producer with all price and yield risks
and keeps specialty corn tied to market conditions for generic corn. The variability of
price premiums from year to year and the reliance on production contracting are also
reflected in higher variability in supply and demand for IP corn compared to generic
corn. This is evidenced by findings of the U.S. Grains Council survey that show the high
degree of entry and exit of farms in and out of specialty crop production. The key factor
drawing farmers in and out of specialty corn is the price premium and the relative returns
compared to generic corn. This close price linkage plays a critical role in market
developments in specialty versus generic corn markets.
For specialty corn types used primarily in corn processing another key factor
affecting price premium received by growers is the impact of market coordination and the
degree of market power along the supply chain. Technological innovations are enabling
corn processing to expand the range of products with unique attributes, and this has
facilitated the emergence of specialty corn types (waxy, high amylose) tailored to
optimize processing options.  These specialty corn types command high premiums and3
are often produced and marketed through an IP system under direct contracts between
processors and growers that bypass intermediate handlers. Within this vertically
coordinated structure one of the factors affecting price determination and returns to
growers is the oligopsonistic buying behavior of processors, owing to a high degree of
industrial concentration.
The objective of this study is to explore the price and market behavior of a corn
market under product differentiation and identity preservation.  Almost all of the existing
studies on differentiated crops have focused on the GM and non-GM crop split (Moschini
et al., 2000; Moss et al., 2002; Giannakas and Fulton, 2001; Lence and Hayes, 2001;
Desquilbet and Bullock, 2002; Maltsbarger and Kalaitzandonakes, 2001). Also, except
for Nadolnyak and Sheldon (2001), all studies have approached crop markets under a
perfect competition assumption.  This study differs from existing literature in that it
considers a more general specification of a differentiated corn market with several
specialty corn types coexisting with generic corn, recognizing that a variety of forces are
shaping product differentiation for corn and biotechnology is only one factor. In addition
to horizontal product differentiation, this study also accounts for imperfect competition
for specialty corn types, incorporating corn processors as oligopsonistic buyers of IP corn
from growers who behave as price takers.  Specific objectives are to: (1) measure the
price effects of different corn types, (2) assess the relative movement of price premiums,
and (3) determine how changing the competitive environment of corn processing
influences market effects and net benefits, given alternative demand shifts for different
corn market segments.4
The Model
This section presents a model of the corn market characterized by the presence of several
specialty or identity preserved corn types in addition to generic corn.  The generic corn
market is characterized by perfect competition, and markets for specialty corns are
characterized by imperfect competition. Such a model is used to understand the
interactions among markets for different types of corn. The model also provides insight
into what happens when new processing firms enter specialty corn markets. The
presentation begins with a two-commodity example to clearly demonstrate the model
structure. The discussion begins with the farm supply component.  It then proceeds to the
demand side for the generic corn market.  Next imperfect competition is introduced in the
specialty corn market.
Farm Sector
The farm supply component assumes that profit-maximizing farms produce two types of
corn under constant returns to scale technology.  Generic corn is subscripted by g, while
corn subscripted by p is a specialty (identity preserved) corn.  Interactions with other
crops, like soybeans, are ignored to keep the model and analysis tractable.  Production
agriculture is assumed to be characterized by perfect competition with free entry and exit
and price taking behavior.  Each type of corn production uses two factors of production.
One factor, L, is mobile with price of w.  The other factor, K, is corn-specific with prices
of rg and rp for generic and specialty corns, respectively.  The factors are in fixed supply.
Using complementarity from the farm profit maximization problem, the above
assumptions give rise to the following model where unit cost given by the left-hand side
equals unit revenue (price) on the right-hand side:5
 (1)  aLg(w, rg, rP)w + aKg(w, rg, rp)rg =  PFg
if Pg $  LR, then PFg = Pg
if Pg < LR, then PFg = LR
 (2)  aLp(w, rg, rp)w + aKp(w, rg, rp)rp =  Pp
 (3)  aLg(w, rg, rp)Qg + aLp(w, rg, rp)Qp =  L
 (4)  aKg(w, rg, rp)Qg =  Kg
 (5)  aKp(w, rg, rp)Qp =  Kp,
where:
Qg     = Output of generic corn by the farm sector; Qg > 0;
Qp   = Output of specialty corn by the farm sector, Qp > 0;
PFg  = Price of generic corn to farmer, PFg > 0;
Pg    = Price of generic corn on market, Pg > 0;
Pp    = Price of specialty corn, Pp > 0;
aLi   = Use of mobile factors per unit of good i, aLi > 0;
aKi   = Use of specific inputs per unit of good i, aKi > 0;
LR  = Loan rate for corn, LR > 0.
An example of this type of supply side modeling can be found in Jones (1981).
Solution to equations (1) through (5) using the implicit function theorem gives the supply
functions for each type of corn:
 (6)  Qg = Qg(PFg, Pp, L, Kg, Kp); ∂ Qg/∂ PFg $ 0;
 (7)  Qp = Qp(PFg, Pp, L, Kg, Kp); ∂ Qp/∂ PP $ 0.6
Demand behavior consists of two components.  One component applies to generic
corn and assumes this market is perfectly competitive.  That allows it to be described by
demand equations as found in traditional commodity models, and the market clears in a
standard fashion.
 (8)  feed:  Fg = Fg(Pg);  ∂ Fg/∂ Pg ≤  0;
 (9)  food:  Cg = Cg(Pg); ∂ Cg/∂ Pg ≤  0;
 (10)  Industrial:  Ig =  Ig(Pg); ∂ Ig/∂ Pg ≤ 0;
 (11)  Ending Stocks:  Eg = Eg(Pg); ∂ Eg/∂ Pg ≤0;
 (12)  Exports:  Xg = Xg(Pg*);  ∂ Xg/∂ Pg ≤ 0;
Trade policy, denoted sg, links the world price of generic corn, Pg
*, to the U.S. price:
 (13)  Pg = Pg
* + sg
Market clearing determines the U.S. price for generic corn (assuming seed is purchased
not saved):
(14)  Xg(Pg - sg) = Eg(-1) + Qg(PFg, Pp, L, Kg, Kp) – Fg(Pg) - Cg(Pg) - Ig(Pg) –
Eg(Pg)
The specialty corn market is assumed to be characterized by imperfect competition
where firms in the market recognize the effect their actions have on rivals.  This
component is described by a two stage game.  Stage I is the entry and exit decision -- the
number of firms, n, is endogenous.  In Stage II firms determine output -- n is given.
Since this research focuses on the specialty corn premiums at a point in time, only Stage
II is modeled.  The model could be solved via backward induction to find n.  Entry and
entry deterrence behavior are examined once the Stage II model is working by
exogenously changing the number of firms.  Specific assumptions for Stage II are:7
1. n symmetric firms produce an output of corn products qR > 0;
2. Output of corn product (for each corn type) is homogeneous;
3. Domestic and international markets are not segmented;
4. Output is freely traded;
5. Firms set the quantity of corn products produced to maximize profit; that is,
corn products are strategic substitutes;
6. Lower case letters denote firm variables. Upper case letters denote market
      variables.
Let demand for a processed product from corn, like starch, be the aggregate of domestic
and export demand.  That is, the output is homogeneous and markets are not segmented
so the firm cannot price discriminate.  Demand is given by CR = CR(PR); ∂ CR/∂ PR ≤ 0,
∂
2CR/∂ PR
2 $ 0.   With quantity competition the inverse demand is:
 (15)  PR = PR(CR); ∂ PR/∂ CR ≤  0; ∂
2PR/∂ CR
2  ≤ 0.
With n symmetric firms CR = nqR
Each firm has a production function that converts corn purchased, qp, into the processed
product (starch) sold, qR:
 (16)  qR = qR(qp); ∂ qR/∂ qp > 0.
Costs are assumed to consist of a fixed cost, φ, plus variable costs of specialty corn. This
means there are returns to scale as average fixed cost falls as output increases.  Other
variable costs are ignored in the formulation to keep the presentation simple.
To construct the firm’s profit maximization problem, invert the supply function
(expression (7)) for specialty corn:
 (17)  Pp = Pp(PFg, Qp, L, Kg, Kp); ∂ Pp/∂ Qp $0,8
where total market output of specialty corn is Qp which equals per firm purchases times
the number of firms, or Qp  = nqp.
Thus, the firm wants to maximize profit (π ) subject to the production function:
 (18)  MAX π = PR(nqR)qR - φ - Pp(PFg, nqp, L, Kg, Kp)qp




First-order conditions for an interior solution (qR > 0; qp > 0) are:
 (19)   ∂ L/∂ qR = PR(nqR) + n.qR (∂ PR/∂ CR) + λ = 0,
 (20)   ∂ L/∂ qp = -Pp(PFg , nqp, L, Kg, Kp)- nqp (∂ Pp/∂ Qp) - λ[∂ qR/∂ qp] = 0,
 (21)  ∂ L/∂ λ = qR - qR(qp) = 0.
Substitute expression (20) and expression (21) into expression (19) to determine the
firm’s purchases of specialty corn:
(22)       (∂ qR/∂ qp){PR(nqR(qp))+nqR(qp)[ ∂ PR/∂ CR]} =
Pp(PFg,nqp,L,Kg,Kp)+nqp[∂ Pp/∂ Qp].
Solving expressions (14) and (22) simultaneously gives qp and Pg.  The farm price for
generic corn is determined by whether Pg is above or below the loan rate.  If the farm
price exceeds the loan rate the market price is used in the farm supply.  But if the market
price is below the loan rate, the loan rate is used as loan deficiency payments equal to the
difference are assumed paid to farmers.  When per firm specialty corn purchase is
determined, multiplication by n gives Qp.  Once total purchases of specialty corn are
known, the price, Pp, is found using the inverse supply expression (17).  The difference
between Pp and PFg or Pg is the premium paid for specialty corn.  Per firm specialty corn
purchases can be used to find per firm corn product output, qR, via the production9
function, expression (16).  Multiplication by the number of firms gives the total output
which determines the price, PR, using the inverse demand equation, expression (15).
Numerical Model
In the numerical model a variety of types of corn are considered, including high-oil corn,
nutritionally dense, waxy corn, amylose corn, and white corn.  Corn types where
imperfect competition prevails (waxy, high amylose) each have expressions like
expression (23).  Corn types characterized by perfect competition (generic, high oil,
nutritionally dense, white) have market clearing identities like expression (14).
Data used in the model include supply, use, and price data and are derived from a
variety of sources, including Jefferson, Traxler, and Wilson; Agriculture Census for
United States (USDA/NASS); USDA/NASS farm survey data (see table 1). Generic area
and production are calculated by subtracting specialty crops (except sweet corn) and seed
from total U.S. corn for grain reported in Agricultural Outlook (USDA/ERS).  Import and
export data are derived from the USITC Trade Database.  That dataset does not report
specialty yellow corn trade, except trade in seed which is excluded from the model.  A
variety of industry sources were used to derive a rough indication of trade volumes for
specialty corn types.
Most usage data comes from the Feed Situation and Outlook Yearbook (USDA/ERS).
That source identifies feed, seed, HFCS, glucose and dextrose, starch, fuel, brewing, and
cereal use.  Glucose and dextrose use is separated based on product supply and use.  Food
use is determined from food consumption survey data (Blisard, 2001). Once total use of
corn by activity is identified individual corn types are allocated based on the major use
classification in Jefferson, Traxler, and Wilson.  High oil corn is assumed exported for10
feed.  Most waxy corn goes into U.S. starch production.  White corn is treated as a food
corn.  Nutritionally dense corn is assumed to be fed while high amylose corn is assumed
milled for starch production.  Use of generic corn by activity is found by removing the
specialty corns from the total.
Parametrization of the numerical model required both calibration and indirect
estimation when data were unavailable.  Supply elasticities are derived based on Cobb-
Douglas technology using unit cost shares from USDA data on cost production, and
shocking the model to arrive at a matrix of elasticities.  Feed demand elasticities for
generic, nutritionally dense and high oil corn are derived using an LP feed ration model
for five livestock types taking feed rations as cost functions.  By varying price and
solving the LPs a set of price and quantity pseudo-data is created from which a feed
elasticity matrix and hence feed demand equations are derived. For the imperfect
competition sectors, the firm level demand elasticity is calibrated by fixing the number of
firms and market conduct. From this, market level demand elasticity is generated.
Simulations and results
We present simulation results of three “what if” scenarios to explore the price and
quantity linkages under alternative demand and market structure scenarios affecting
specialty and generic corn differentially.  In scenario 1, we implement an exogenous
demand shift of 10% for specialty corn types with domestic use—waxy, high amylose
and nutritionally dense. High oil corn, which is totally exported and white corn
exclusively for food use are not shocked. This scenario can be thought of as representing
favorable domestic market conditions for specialty corn, reflected in stronger demand and11
expanded specialty corn utilization leading to a higher price premium relative to generic
corn. In scenario 2, the exogenous demand shock of 10% is extended to include generic
corn in addition to the three specialty corn types. This scenario can be thought of as the
“ethanol effect” that pushes up demand for all corn types.
In scenario 3, we consider an alternative market structure scenario by allowing firm
entry into the corn processing. This would be a case, for example, when a farm
cooperative enters corn processing in order to internalize value added. In all 3 scenarios
we assume a loan rate for corn is in effect for all corn types. That is, when market price
falls below loan rates, growers receive the loan rate.  This implies that growers of
specialty corn continue to hold ownership of the crop when they enter into a production
contract with processors.
Simulation results are shown in table 2. The exogenous increase in specialty corn
demand simulated in scenario 1 results in higher prices for all specialty corn types.
Specialty corn prices increase about 2% and the generic corn price increases 0.5% due to
the slight reduction in output (-0.1%) that results from substitution away from generic to
specialty corn production. The price of white corn, which does not benefit from the
demand shock, is unchanged.  The percentage premia changes are greater.  Specialty corn
premia increases—nutritionally dense (+17.7%--from $7.9 to $9.3), waxy (+14.9%), and
high amylose (+4.4%)—while the white corn premium declines (-3.3%). Given the
significant shares of feed and industrial uses for generic corn, there are stronger
substitution effects between generic corn on hand and feed type corn (N. dense, HO) and
industrial (waxy, h. amylose) than with food corn types (white).12
Under scenario 2, with a demand boost for domestic uses for specialty and generic
corn (at 10% of base quantities), market prices rise more sharply than in scenario 1 (when
only specialty corn demand is raised). Increased feed and industrial demand for generic
corn results in a substitution away from demand for food, exports, and stocks with a net
output increase of 0.5%. The price increase ranged from 12.1% for high oil to 16.4% for
generic corn. However, despite significant price increases for specialty corn induced by
the demand boost, price premiums relative to generic corn fell for all specialty corn types.
The exception is high amylose for which the premium increased (+9.8%) despite a lower
price increase (13.9%) compared to generic corn (+16.4%).  The much larger absolute
price premium for high amylose ($42 in benchmark compared to $9.1 for waxy) accounts
for the price premium boost.  For the other specialty corn not shocked with a demand
increase, such as high oil (used for exports) and white (food), relative prices or price
premiums vis-a-vis generic corn deteriorate even more than specialty corn for feed or
industrial use. The price linkages between generic and specialty corn show that favorable
demand conditions for generic corn can have a negative impact on price premia for
specialty corn types.  Also the magnitude of the price effects in scenario 2 compared to
scenario 1, show that initial market shares play a significant role in market outcomes for
various specific corn types.
We also checked for the sensitivity of these results due to the presence of the loan rate
and the initial market prices relative to loan rates. The extent of supply response from
exogenous demand boost may be affected by the relative position of market price vis a
vis the loan rate.  As a sensitivity analysis, we repeated scenario 2 (scenario 2b) using as
a starting point a market price for generic corn just above the loan rate, derived via a13
preliminary simulation. Numerical results from scenario 2b show that quantities and price
responses are somewhat larger in magnitude but in the same direction comparing to
scenario 2 (where initial market price is somewhat below the loan rate). The implication
here is that the demand boost needs to be larger when market price is below the loan rate
to induce a full supply response.
In scenario 3, we examine increased firm competition at the starch processing level
by simulating an exogenous increase in firm number in waxy and high amylose
processing.  Simulation results show that increased firm competition boosts demand and
output for waxy and high amylose corn.  Mark-ups also shrink, reducing starch prices as
additional firms now supply the market.  This translates into higher corn prices with
market prices rising by 1.8% for waxy and by 2.2% for h. amylose.  Since the generic
corn price is not significantly affected, there is an increase in price premia for both waxy
corn (15.1%) and high amylose (5.66%).
Conclusions
This study offers an empirical analysis of dynamics of price premia for several identity
preserved (or specialty) corn types when they co-exist with generic corn in a
differentiated market. The study examines the price and market impacts when these
specialty corn types are subject to different demand conditions and changing competition
structure beyond the farm gate.
Simulation results suggest that given its dominant market share, changes in generic
corn have greater impact on specialty corns than changes in specialty corns have on the
generic market.  Thus specialty corn markets must expand greatly before they will14
generate large positive spillover effects on commodity corn.  The study demonstrates that
price and market incentives for growing specialty corn depend significantly on the
generic corn market. While specialty crops can mean high-value for an individual grower
who receives price premiums, at the market level these premia are the result of supply
and demand factors linking several sub-markets with generic corn serving as the default
system.  The interplay of these factors determines relative prices and hence growers’
decisions between planting generic and specialty corn types.
The study also shows that the competitive structure affects prices and price premia for
growers and processors and that through increased competition within processing, corn
growers may receive improved price premia. This outcome is particularly important when
production and delivery is handled via direct contracts between growers and processors.15
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Table 1: Calculated Supply and Use of Corn by Type, 1999
1
Generic High Waxy White Nutri. High Pop Sweet
Oil Dense Amylose
Area (thd. Ha.) 27,228.63 404.86 222.67 445.34 80.97 18.22 136.55 285.5
Y i e l d  ( m t / h a ) 8 . 3 69 . 2 29 . 7 29 . 2 29 . 2 95 . 8 33 . 3 1 1 4 . 4 3
Quantities in thousand metric tons
Beginning Stock
2 4 5 , 3 9 2 . 3 60000000
Output 227,755.10 3,734.01 2,165.47 4,107.41 751.88 106.31 451.96 4,121.04
Imports 179.16 0 0 55.91 0 0 0.34 47.03
Exports 43,554.23 3,732.78 4 1,604.00 0 0 102.5 320.26
Feed 143,147.50000 7 5 1 . 6 3000
Wet Mill 37,816.43 0 2,160.76 0 0 106.27 0 0
H F C S 1 3 , 7 1 6 . 7 70000000
G l u c o s e 4 , 5 4 6 . 8 60000000
D e x t r o s e1 , 0 9 2 . 2 60000000
Starch 4,108.73 0 2,160.76 0 0 106.27 0 0
F u e l 1 4 , 3 5 1 . 8 10000000
B r e w i n g 3 , 3 0 2 . 1 90000000
Food 1,791.94 0 0 2,557.97 0 0 349.8 3,657.60
Ending Stock
2 4 3 , 6 3 9 . 6 60000000
Loss
3 7 5 . 6 51 . 2 30 . 7 11 . 3 50 . 2 50 . 0 3 0 0
Prices in dollars per ton:
Market 71.65 79.52 80.7 80.7 79.52 114.95 220.46 478.4
Loan
4 74.41
1 Supply and use of seed corn is exlcuded
2 Due to lack of data stocks for specialty corns are assumed zero althrough processors might carry 
over working stocks.
3 Calculated as a percent of production using the aggregate forn for grain share.
4 Speciality corns assumed under contract and not available for LDPs
Sources: Specialty corn area, output, and price (except pop and sweet)- Jefferson, Traxler and Wislon
Popcorn area and yield- USDA/NASS
Sweet corn - Lucier and Lin; Lucier and Plummer
Total corn - USDA/ERS
Trade- USITC and industry sources18
Table 2.  Model simulation results: price and market effects (percent change from base)
Benchmark Increased demand use for: Firm entry
Specialty Specialty into corn
Corn types Units or base corn & generic corn processing
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scneario 3
Generic
Output mt 227842.8 -0.1 0.5 -0.1
Feed use mt 143167.6 0.2 9.3 0.0
Industrial use mt 41157.7 -0.1 8.8 0.0
Food use mt 1791.8 -0.1 -4.9 0.0
Exports mt 43555.0 -0.6 -19.6 -0.2
End. Stocks mt 43667.0 -0.5 -16.4 -0.1
Market price $/mt 71.6 0.5 16.4 0.1
Producer price $/mt 74.4 0.0 12.0 0.0
High oil
Output mt 3733.5 -99.7 -99.7
Exports mt 3732.3 -99.9 -99.6
Market price $/mt 79.5 -97.2 -82.3
Producer price $/mt 79.5 -77.7 -108.7
Price premium $/mt 7.9 -100.0 -100.0
Nutri. Dense 
Output mt 751.8 9.9 9.9
Feed use mt 751.5 9.9 9.9
Market price $/mt 79.5 2.2 14.1
Producer price $/mt 79.5 2.2 14.1
Price premium $/mt 7.9 17.7 -7.0
Waxy
Output mt 2189.5 10.2 10.2 9.0
Industrial use mt 2158.7 10.4 10.4 9.1
Exports mt 30.0 -0.2 -1.4 -0.2
Market price $/mt 80.7 2.1 14.0 1.8
Producer price $/mt 80.7 2.1 14.0 1.8
Price premium $/mt 9.1 14.9 -5.2 15.1
WAXY PROCESSING
starchcons mt 1321.2 -1.1 -3.9 9.1
starchprice $/mt 442.0 0.7 2.5 -5.8
High Amylose
Output mt 106.4 9.3 9.2 10.5
Industrial use mt 100.4 9.9 9.9 11.1
Exports mt 6.0 -0.2 -1.5 -0.3
Market price $/mt 113.6 2.0 13.9 2.2
Producer price $/mt 113.6 2.0 13.9 2.2
Price premium $/mt 42.0 4.4 9.8 5.7
HIGH AMYLOSE PROC
starchcons mt 55.8 -0.6 -2.0 11.1
starchprice $/mt 1101.0 0.5 1.6 -8.6
White
Output mt 4107.4 0.0 -3.4
Food use mt 2558.0 0.0 -3.4
Exports mt 1604.0 0.0 -3.4
Market price $/mt 80.7 0.0 11.2
Producer price $/mt 80.7 0.0 11.2
Price premium $/mt 9.1 -3.5 -29.4